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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case comes to the Court on Total Success Investments, LLC's ("TS!") appeal from 
the district court's denial of TSI's petition for a writ of mandate ordering the Ada County 
Highway District ("ACHD") to force Washington Mutual Bank ("Washington Mutual") to 
remove certain landscaping and Idaho Power Company ("Idaho Power") to remove two power 
poles that encroach on a platted alley ("Alley"). The district court denied the proposed writ, 
ruling that because the encroachments did not "effectually obstruct and prevent the use" of the 
Alley pursuant to Idaho Code § 40-2319, the question of whether to compel their removal was at 
the discretion of ACHD, and thus not a proper subject for a writ of mandate absent an abuse of 
that discretion. 
Following TSI's appeal, ACHD cross-appealed regarding the district court's denial of an 
award of expert witness costs and attorney fees incurred below. 
II. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The Alley at the center of this dispute connects State Street on the south with Dewey 
Street on the north, and is located between 35th and 36th Streets in Boise, Idaho. The known 
history of the Alley began with the recording of the plat map for the Cruzen Addition on 
November 28, 1906. Def. Ex. A at 4. That 1906 plat dedicated a 12 foot wide alley to the public. 
Ada County Highway District v. Total Success Investments, LLC., 145 Idaho 360, 364, 179 P .3d 
323, 327 (2008). Unfortunately, when the roadway for the Alley was created it either was not 
located precisely where it had been platted, or over the decades its location came to deviate from 
the path recorded on the plat. See Def. Ex. A at 4. 
Later, beginning at some time prior to 1957, power poles were installed along the western 
edge of the Alley by Idaho Power Company. Def. Ex. A at 4. In 1997 a cell phone tower (the 
"Cell Tower") and an associated 12 by 24 foot building were constructed adjacent to the Alley on 
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property later owned by TSI. Def. Ex. A at 6. The Cell Tower and associated structure were 
fenced off from the surrounding property and leased to a wireless telephone provider. Ada 
County Highway District, 145 Idaho at 364, 179 P.3d at 327. 
TSI is owned by Thomas LaVoie, Sr. and his wife Nancy LaVoie. Def. Ex. A at 8. In 
July, 2001, the LaVoies' entity Total Success Investments LTD II purchased certain property 
(the "TSI Property") adjacent to the Alley on its east side, which includes numerous lots of 
commercial property as well as the leased space containing the subject Cell Tower, from the 
LaVoies' daughter and son-in-law. Def. Ex. A at 8. Later, the LaVoies transferred Total 
Success Investments LTD II's interest in the TSI Property to their limited liability company, TSI. 
Def Ex. A at 9. 
In 2003, TS! c01mnissioned a professional survey of the Property, and this survey 
revealed that the actual physical path of the Alley is slightly to the east of the platted location and 
partially on the TSI Property. Def. Ex. A at 9. As a result of the historical misaligmnent of the 
Alley, existing power poles as well as an embankment and landscaping belonging to Washington 
Mutual on the opposite (west) side of the Alley from the cell tower encroach slightly on the 
space platted for the Alley. See Def. Ex. A at 9. TSI complained to ACHD, demanding that the 
Alley be moved to the west. ACHD, however, declined to compel the removal of the power 
poles and Washington Mutual's landscaping because these long-established features did not 
prevent the flow of traffic through the Alley. See Def. Ex. A at 9-10. 
TSI then took matters into its own hands by relocating the fence enclosing the cell tower 
approximately six feet to the west - so that it extended into the path of traffic. Ada County 
Highway District, 145 Idaho at 364-65; Def. Ex. A at 10-11. The fence relocated by TSI created 
an obstruction preventing "all but the smallest motor vehicles from using the alley." Def. Ex. A 
at 1 I. 
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After TSI refused to remove the obstruction, ACHD brought an action for quiet title to 
establish the presence of a pre-existing prescriptive easement, and for ejectment of the relocated 
fence. Ada County Highway District, 145 Idaho at 365, 179 P .2d at 328. A bench trial was held 
before the Honorable Joel D. Horton in 2005, following which the court issued Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, ruling that ACHD had acquired a prescriptive easement along the 
Alley's historical path and authorizing the issuance of a writ of assistance instructing the Ada 
County Sheriff to assist with removal of the obstruction erected by TSI. Id.; Def. Ex. A. 
Unsatisfied with the result of the trial, TSI appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court. In Ada 
County Highway Dist. v. Total Success Investments, LLC, 145 Idaho 360, 179 P.3d 323 (2008), 
the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court ruling in favor of ACHD in all respects. Id. 
Thereafter, upon demand from ACHD the fence was returned to its original location adjacent to 
the Cell Tower and traffic was again able to flow through the Alley. 
Two months after the Idaho Supreme Court's decision, TSI filed an Application for 
Alternative Writ of Mandate demanding the removal of landscaping belonging to Washington 
Mutual Bank and power poles belonging to Idaho Power from the west side of the Alley that sits 
opposite to TSI's Property. R., p. 3C-28. The landscaping and power poles encroached slightly 
into the Alley as originally platted, and TSI asserted that ACHD was obligated, pursuant to Idaho 
Code §§ 62-705 and 40-2319, to order their removal. See R., p.6. 
Two hearings on an order to show cause were held before the Honorable Kathryn 
Sticklen in the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the 
County of Ada. A series of exhibits were entered by both parties, and TSI presented testimony 
from two witnesses. At the close of TSI's presentation of evidence, ACHD and Washington 
Mutual moved for an involuntary dismissal of the application for a writ of mandate. Following 
oral argument and time to take the motion under advisement, the district court entered a written 
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Memorandum Decision and Order granting ACHD and Washington Mutual's motion to dismiss, 
and denying the petition for writ of mandate. R., p. 47-54. In its decision, the district court ruled 
that a writ of mandate does not generally issue to compel the performance of a discretionary act, 
and that by statute the determination of whether to order the removal of an encroachment that 
does not prevent the use of a right-of-way is placed at the discretion of highway districts such as 
ACHD. R. p. 51-52. The district court found that the encroachments at issue did not obstruct or 
prevent the use of the Alley, and therefore the question was one of ACHD's discretion and the 
petition for a writ of mandate was denied. R. p. 52-53. 
As a result of the retirement of Judge Sticklen, subsequent proceedings were transferred 
to the Honorable George D. Carey. Both Washington Mutual and ACHD sought an award of 
costs and attorney fees. Judge Carey granted costs and fees to Washington Mutual, but although 
ACHD was found to be entitled to costs as a prevailing party, ACHD's request for expert witness 
fees and attorney's fees was denied. R., p. 59-65. 
TS! filed a timely appeal from Judge Sticklen's denial of TSI's application for writ of 
mandate. ACHD filed a timely cross-appeal from Judge Carey's denial of ACHD's request for 
expert witness costs and attorney fees. 
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III. ISSUES PRESENTED ON CROSS-APPEAL 
1. Did the district court err in failing to grant ACHD an award for its expert witness costs? 
2. Did the district court err in failing to grant ACHD an award of attorney's fees pursuant to 
Idaho Code§§ 12-117, 12-121, and 12-123? 
IV. ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Is ACHD entitled to an award of attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 12-
117 and/or 12-121? 
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V. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
On appeal from the denial of a writ of mandate (also called a writ of mandamus), an 
Idaho appellate court applies the same standard as the district couti. Brady v. City of Homedale, 
130 Idaho 569, 571, 944 P.2d 704, 706 (1997). Judicial review of the district court's denial of a 
petition for a writ of mandamus "is limited to determining whether [the petitioner] had a clear 
legal right to the relief sought." Id. "Proceedings for writ of mandamus 'are not available to 
review the acts of boards in respect to matter as to which they are vested with discretion, unless 
it clearly appears that they have acted arbitrarily and unjustly and in abuse of the discretion 
vested in them."' Id. ( quoting Kolp v. Board of Trustees of Butte County Joint Sch. Dist. No. 
111,102 Idaho 320,323,629 P.2d 1153, 1156 (1981)). 
On a motion for involuntary dismissal in an action tried by the court without a jury 
following the plaintiffs or petitioner's presentation of evidence, "[t]he judge, as sole trier of 
facts, is not required to construe evidence favorably to the plaintiff." Allen v. Burggraf Const. 
Co., 106 Idaho 451, 452, 680 P.2d 873, 874 (Ct.App. 1984). "Rather, he may evaluate the 
evidence and choose the inferences to be drawn. The court must determine whether the 
evidence, as so evaluated, is sufficient to show a right to the relief sought." Id. The trial court's 
determination will not be disturbed on appeal "unless it is shown to be clearly etToneous." Id. 
VI. ARGUMENT 
A "writ of mandate" is recognized under Idaho law as being identical to a "writ of 
mandamus." LC.§ 7-301. The Idaho Supreme Court defines such a writ as "a command issuing 
from a court of competent jurisdiction, directed to an inferior court, tribunal, board, corporation 
or person, requiring the performance by the party of a particular duty which results from the 
official station of that party or from operation of law." Idaho Falls Redevelopment Agency v. 
Countryman, 118 Idaho 43, 44, 794 P .2d 632, 633 (1990). A writ of mandate is not issued as a 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 6 
matter of right, and instead the decision to grant or refuse an application is a matter of discretion 
for the court. Idaho Falls Redevelopment Agency, 118 Idaho at 44, 794 P.2d at 633. "If the evils 
following the issuance of a writ will outweigh the evils sought to be corrected, the court may, in 
the exercise of discretion, refuse to issne the writ" even if the petitioner would be otherwise 
entitled. Hunke v. Foote, 84 Idaho 391,398,373 P.2d 322,325 (1962). 
In the proceeding below, TS! set forth two statutes as the basis for the proposed writ of 
mandate: Idaho Code§ 62-705 and Idaho Code§ 40-2319. The first of these, Idaho Code§ 62-
705, concerns only rights of way for electrical power lines and does not apply at all within the 
limits of incorporated cities such as Boise. TSI accordingly does not appeal with respect to that 
statute, an instead has limited its appeal to consideration of whether ACHD was required to act 
under the other statute, Idaho Code§ 40-2319. TS! asserts that Idaho Code§ 40-2319, which 
concerns the removal of encroachments from public rights-of-way, provides authority for writ of 
mandate it seeks. 
A. Idaho Code§ 40-2319 does not provide authority for the writ of mandate sought by TSI. 
"A party seeking a writ of mandate must establish a 'clear legal right to the relief 
sought."' Almgren v. Idaho Dept. of Lands, 136 Idaho 180, 183, 30 P.3d 958, 961 (2001) 
(quoting Brady, 130 Idaho at 571, 944 P.2d at 706). Such a writ "will lie if the officer against 
whom the writ is brought has a clear legal duty to perform and if the desired act sought to be 
compelled is ministerial or executive in nature, and does not require the exercise of discretion." 
Almgren, 136 Idaho at 183, 30 P.3d at 961 (quoting Cowles Pub. Co. v. Magistrate Court, 118 
Idaho 753, 760, 800 P.2d 640, 647 (1990)). "A writ of mandate will not issue to 'compel the 
performance of a discretionary act."' Brady, 130 Idaho at 571, 944 P.2d at 706; Idaho County 
Property Owners Ass 'n, Inc. v. Syringa General Hosp. Dist., 119 Idaho 309,314, 805 P.2d 1233, 
1238 (1991) ("Mandamus will not lie to coerce or control discretion"); Bopp v. City of 
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Sandpoint, 110 Idaho 488,490, 716 P.2d 1260, 1262 (1986) ("writs of mandate ... will not issue 
to compel the performance of a purely discretionary function"); Lisker v. City and/or Village of 
Potlatch, 101 Idaho 343, 345, 612 P.2d 1190, 1192 (1980) ("When the acts of a municipal 
corporation are discretionary and not mandatory, a writ of mandate will not lie to compel the 
performance of such an act"); Saviers v. Richey, 96 Idaho 413,415,529 P.2d 1285, 1287 (1974) 
(writ of mandate inappropriate to compel discretionary acts); District Bd. of Health of Public 
Health Dist. No. 5 v. Chancey, 94 Idaho 944, 947, 500 P.2d 845, 848 (1972) (a writ of mandate 
is not available where the act or duty at issue "require[ s] the exercise of discretion"). 
Idaho Code§ 40-2319, the statute relied upon by TSI, provides in pertinent part, that: 
ff any highway or public right-of-way under the jurisdiction or a county or 
highway district is encroached upon by gates, fences, buildings, or otherwise, the 
appropriate county or highway district may require the encroachment to be 
removed. If the encroachment is of a nature as to effectually obstruct and prevent 
the use of the highway or public right-of-way for vehicles, the county or highway 
district shall immediately cause the encroachment to be removed. 
LC. § 40-2319(1) (emphasis added). Reading the statute, one observes that it envisions two 
possible scenarios, each with its own rules. The first scenario arises where there is an 
encroachment on the public right of way, but the encroachment does not prevent the use of the 
right-of-way for vehicles. In that situation the statute provides that the highway district "may" 
require the encroachment to be removed. Id. The second scenario arises where the 
encroachment does prevent vehicles from making use of the right-of-way. Id. In that situation, 
the statute provides that the highway district "shall" cause the encroachment to be removed. Id. 
When used in a statute, the word "may" is permissive and indicates the existence of 
discretion. See Doe v. State, 137 Idaho 758, 760, 53 P.3d 341, 343 (2002) ("[w]hen used in a 
statute, the word 'may' is pennissive rather than the inoperative or mandatory meaning of 'must' 
or 'shall"'). The use of the word "shall" in a statute indicates that the contemplated action is 
mandatory, and thereby indicates a Jack of discretion. See id. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 8 
Therefore, here the determination of whether the removal of the landscaping and power 
poles is discretionary or mandatory for ACHD turns on the question of whether those 
encroachments "effectually obstruct and prevent" public's use of the right-of-way for vehicles. 
The permissive language in Idaho Code § 40-23 I 9 (I) grants ACHD discretion regarding 
whether to require the removal of encroachments that do not block vehicular traffic. "A writ of 
mandate will not issue to compel the performance of a discretionary act." Brady, 130 Idaho at 
571, 944 P.2d at 706. Therefore, a writ of mandate will not lie to compel ACHD's performance 
unless the encroachments at issue are shown to "effectually obstruct and prevent" the public's 
use of the right~of-way. LC. § 40-2319. 
1. The Court correctly found that evidence regarding a parking area adjacent to the 
Alley did not establish that use of the Alley itself was effectually obstructed and 
prevented. 
In the proceedings below, TSI did not contend that the encroachments at issue blocked 
the flow of traffic through the Alley. Instead, TSI asserted that the encroachments made it 
difficult to pull directly into and out of a parking area located midway through the Alley without 
making a three or four point tum. For that proposition, TSI presented evidence from two 
witnesses, Mr. La Voie and Miguel Hurdado, the owner of a restaurant that is a tenant of TSI. 
Mr. LaVoie testified that the encroachments make it more difficult for him to pull in and out of 
the parking area, but Mr. La Voie did not suggest that it prevented him or anyone else from 
travelling along the Alley itself. Tr. p. 67, L.20 - p. 68, L.22; p. 104, L.25 - p. 105, L.25. Mr. 
Hurdado testified that the encroachments make it more difficult to park his two catering ttucks, 
one 22-foot truck and one 24-foot truck, in the parking area alongside the Alley. Tr. p. 53, L.11 
- p. 59, L.6. Mr. Hurdado stated, however, that his difficulty was only with pulling into and out 
of the parking area - the encroachments did not prevent him from travelling through the Alley 
even in a full-size catering truck. Tr. p. 57, L.20 - p. 58, L.14. Indeed, it did not even prevent 
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him from using the parking area; it only required him to make a wider turn. Tr. p. 58, L.19 - p. 
59, L.6. 
The district court considered the evidence offered by TSI, but determined that evidence 
concerning inconvenience in turning in and out of the parking area alongside the Alley did not 
show an effectual obstruction and prevention of use of the Alley itself. The district court wrote 
in its Memorandum Decision and Order that: 
In this case persons parking in the lot behind the Total Success property are able 
to enter and exit the property and are able to use the alley without obstruction. 
Total Success's owner, Thomas LaVoie, testified that he was able to park his 
truck in the back of his property, but that he often had to utilize a three-point turn 
in order to exit his parking space. The Court cannot find that inconvenient 
parking either obstructs or prevents the use of the alley. While pull-out parking 
would be more convenient, the Court cannot find that the level of inconvenience 
involved is an obstruction or prevention of use of the alley. 
R. p. 53 (emphasis added). 
On appeal, TSI argues that the district court erred by failing to consider evidence that 
"some uses" of the Alley were prevented. Appellant's Brief, p. 7-8. TSI, however, only directs 
the Court's attention to a single citation to what it represents as being such evidence, a portion of 
TSI's direct examination of Mr. LaVoie at the October 16, 2008 show cause hearing. See 
Appellant's Brief, p. 7. TSI's brief did not quote the text of the transcript itself, and so the full 
exchange to which TS! cited is provided here: 
Q. [By counsel for TS!] When you leave that spot, wherever you park, can you leave 
that spot and make that turn without having to negotiate around the comer to drive 
in or out of the alley, either State or Dewey? 
A. [by Mr. La Voie] I can only leave from that spot and go to Dewey, because of the 
fence and protective bumper [around the Cell Tower on TSI's property]. And 
then it's too tight for my - they don't have a fast turning radius on that model. 
So it's a struggle. 
Q. Would you be able to make that turn if the railroad ties or the power pole were not 
in the alley? 
A. With ease. 
Tr. p. 68, L.9-22. 
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Contrary to TSI's assertion, the exchange quoted above concerns the inconveniences in 
using the parking area alongside the Alley. The district court specifically considered this 
evidence, but found that inconveniences in pulling into and out of the parking area did not 
constitute the effectual obstruction and prevention of use of the Alley itself. See R. p. 53. TS! 
did not present evidence showing such an effectual obstruction and prevention of use of the 
public-right-of way itself, and, indeed, Mr. Hurdado, TSI's own witness, testified that he was 
able to travel through the Alley in a large catering truck. Tr. p. 57, L.20 - p. 58, L.7. 1 
Accordingly, the district court's finding was supported by substantial and competent evidence 
and was not error. 
2. ACHD did not abuse its discretion, and the issue was not raised below. 
On appeal, TS! also argues that if the determination of whether to order the removal of 
the encroachments at issue is _at the discretion of ACHD, then the district court erred by not 
discussing whether ACHD's refusal to do so was an abuse of such discretion. Appellant's Brief, 
p. 5-6. TSI contends (without authority) that the sole reason highway districts have discretion 
over such determinations is to save money, but since Washington Mutual and Idaho Power 
would be paying for the removal of the encroachments themselves, there is no reason for ACHD 
not to order the removal of the encroachments and its refusal to do so was an abuse of discretion. 
Appellant's Brief, p. 6. 
There are a number of problems with TSI's argument. The first of these is that it is being 
offered for the first time on appeal. TSI's position during the proceedings before the district 
court was that removal of the encroachments was mandatory and ACHD was without discretion 
in the matter. TS! did not raise the issue of whether ACHD abused its discretion until its brief on 
1 The question is also res judicata in light of Judge Horton's 2005 finding that the Alley was in regular use despite 
the power poles and landscaping until TS!' s temporary relocation of the Cell Tower fence. Def. Ex. A at 9-l 1; see 
also Ada County Highway District, 145 Idaho at 367, 179 P.3d at 330 (discussing evidence of use of the Alley). 
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appeal. "[I]ssues not argued before the trial court will not be considered when raised for the first 
time on appeal." Mackowiak v. Harris, 146 Idaho 864, 866, 204 P.2d 504, 506 (2009) (quoting 
Farr v. Mischler, 129 Idaho 201,205,923 P.2d 446,450 (1996)). 
Second, TSI has failed to present any evidence that would have supported a finding of an 
abuse of discretion by ACHD. In an action for a writ of mandate any alleged abuse of discretion 
"must be clearly shown" as ACHD is entitled to a presumption that it acts were not an abuse of 
discretion. See Kolp, 102 Idaho at 323, 629 P.2d at 1156 ("To establish capriciousness or 
arbitrariness on the part of a board requires more than conjecture or assumption, but must be 
clearly shown, it being presumed that public boards do not abuse their discretion and act from 
proper motives and valid reasons" (quoting Wellard v. Marcum, 82 Idaho 232, 236, 351 P.2d 
482,483 (1960)). 
Third, ACHD's discretion as to whether or not to order removal of encroachments is 
based on more than expense. Ordering the removal of encroachments is always "free" in the 
sense that the owner or person causing the encroachment - not the highway district - is the party 
that is statutorily responsible to pay for removal. LC. § 40-2319(2)-(5). If, as TSI proposes, 
ACHD were required to order the removal of an encroachment any time doing so would be done 
without expense to ACHD, then ACHD would be obligated to order the removal of all 
encroachments, no matter how harmless, and the discretion provided to highway districts under 
Idaho Code 40-2319(1) would be entirely extinguished. ACHD's discretion is based on more 
than expense - including not only the allocation of resources, but also a desire not to place 
unnecessary burdens on landowners whose encroachments do not affect safety2 or block traffic. 
2 Safety was one of the concerns addressed below by ACHD since removal of the power poles would potentially 
shift traffic dangerously close to the door to one building on the west side of the Alley. R. p. 39-40. 
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B. Costs and attorney fees. 
ACHD sought an award of costs and attorney fees below. Following the retirement of 
Judge Sticklen, the Honorable George D. Carey ruled that ACHD was the prevailing party and 
entered an award of $54 for service of process fees, but denied ACHD' s request for expert 
witness fees and for attorney fees. ACHD has cross-appealed the district court's denial of its 
claims for attorney fees and expert witness costs. 
1. The district court erred in denying ACHD's request for expert witness fees. 
ACHD retained a surveyor who was one of the witnesses ACHD was set to present at the 
October 16, 2008 show cause hearing. Although the surveyor was present in the courtroom and 
prepared to testify, he never did so because of the court's involuntary dismissal of the action 
following TSI's presentation of evidence. 
ACHD sought $2,000 in expert witness costs pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 
54(d)(l)(C)(8) and an additional $650 in such costs pursuant to 54(d)(J)(D). Rule 54(d)(l)(C)(8) 
provides for costs as a matter or right for "Reasonable expert witness fees for an expert who 
testifies at a deposition or at trial of an action not to exceed the sum of $2,000 for each expert 
witness for all appearances." The district court denied ACHD's request for costs as a matter of 
right pursuant to Rule 54( d)(l )(C)(8) on the basis that the surveyor did not actually testify. R. p. 
61. 
Expert witness fees are also available under Rule 54(d)(l)(D) as discretionary costs if 
"such costs were necessary and exceptional costs reasonably incurred, and should in the interest 
of justice be assessed against the adverse party." ACHD requested such an award, but the 
district court denied the request, ruling that although the cost was routine, it was not 
"exceptional." R. p. 61. 
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The district court's denial of ACHD's expert witness fees as a "discretionary cost" under 
Rule 54(d)(l)(D) was error. The expense of a surveyor in a case involving real property is a 
necessary expense, and here the interest of justice argues strongly for permitting ACHD to 
recover for the expenditure. The surveyor was ready and prepared to testify. The only reason he 
did not do so was because TSI's petition was involuntarily dismissed at the close of TSI's 
presentation of evidence. Denying ACHD an award of expert witness costs would, oddly, 
penalize ACHD for obtaining an involuntary dismissal. Those extraordinary circumstances also 
satisfied the requirement under the Rule that the cost be "exceptional." Accordingly, the district 
court's denial of ACHD's request was error, and ACHD should be awarded the full $2,650 
incurred in expert witness fees as discretionary costs under Rule 54( d)(l )(D). 
2. The district court erred in denyiug ACHD's request for attorney fees below. 
ACHD sought attorney fees below pursuant to Idaho Code§§ 12-117, 12-121, and 12-
123. Idaho Code § 12-117 provides that in an administrative or civil judicial proceeding 
involving as adverse parties a state agency, a county, a city, or other taxing district, and a person, 
the court "shall" award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party if the opposing party 
"acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law." I.C. § 12-117 (emphasis added); Kootenai Med. 
Ctr. v. Bonner County Commr's., 141 Idaho 7, 10-11, 105 P.3d 667, 670-71 (2004). The district 
court denied ACHD's request for attorney fees under Idaho Code 12-117, stating that "[d]uring 
· oral argument, ACHD's attorney conceded that his client was not a state agency, a city, a county, 
or a taxing district." R. p. 62. Review of the transcript of the February 4, 2009 hearing on 
ACHD's and Washington Mutual's requests for costs and fees, however, reveals that counsel for 
ACHD made no such concession. Supp. Tr. p. 12, L.18 - p. 13, L.17. Instead, counsel for 
ACHD stated that he was informed that ACHD did not directly assess taxes, but he was not sure 
what effect that has on ACHD's status as a taxing district. Supp. Tr. p. 12, L.18 - p. 13, L.17. In 
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fact, in Idaho a highway district j.§ a taxing district. Idaho Code § 40-1309(3) (authorizing 
highway districts to levy taxes); Stark v. McLaughlin, 45 Idaho 112, 26 P. 244, 246-47 (1927) 
(stating that a highway district is a taxing district). As a result, the district court erred in failing 
consider whether ACHD was entitled to an award of attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-
117. 
A qualified prevailing party is entitled to an award of attorney fees under Idaho Code § 
12-117 if "the party against whom the judgment is rendered acted without a reasonable basis in 
fact or Jaw. Here, TSI sought a writ of mandate to compel ACHD to order the removal of 
encroachments even though TSI's evidence concerned only a parking area and TSI did not even 
aJlege that the encroachments at issue obstructed or prevented the use of a public right-of-way. 
As a result, the action brought by TSI in the present case was without a reasonable basis in fact 
or Jaw, and an award of fees under Idaho Code§ 12-117 was merited. 
The district court's denial of ACHD's requests for attorney fees under Idaho Code 12-
121 and 12-123 was similarly error. An award of attorney fees is appropriate under Idaho Code 
§ 12-121 if the Court determines the case was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, 
unreasonably or without foundation. Mutual of Enumclaw Ins. Co. v. Pedersen, 133 Idaho 135, 
139, 983 P.2d 208,212 (1999). Along the same lines, Idaho Code 12-123 provides for an award 
of fees if one party engages in "frivolous conduct." 
In the present case, the district court ruled that TSI's suit was not frivolous because "there 
was evidence to support the claim of encroachment, even though the evidence did not reach the 
point of establishing that the encroachment effectually prevented or obstructed use of the right of 
way by vehicles." R. p. 63. There are two difficulties with the district court's reasoning. First, 
"evidence to support the claim of encroachment" did not represent a victory for TSI since the 
fact that the landscaping and power poles encroached on the Alley as platted in 1906 was 
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undisputed, as that fact had also been undisputed in TSI's prior lawsuit. Def. Ex. A at 5 (Judge 
Horton's 2005 findings of fact regarding the power poles); Def. Ex. A at 9-10 (Judge Horton's 
2005 findings of fact regarding Washington Mutual' s landscaping). The existence of the 
encroachments was never an issue - the only question was whether the encroachments 
effectually obstructed and prevented use of the Alley. 
Second, the evidence presented by TSI did not merely fail to "reach the point of 
establishing that the encroachment effectually prevented or obstructed use of the right of way by 
vehicles." R. p. 63. It was not a matter in insufficient weight - TSI's evidence was not even 
relevant to that question. TS! presented testimony from two witnesses concerning the 
inconvenience of pulling into and out of the small parking area adjacent to the Alley. There was 
no evidence presented to suggest that use of the Alley itself was effectually obstructed and 
prevented, and one ofTSI's witnesses, Mr. Hurdado, even affirmatively testified that he was able 
to travel through the Alley in a large catering truck. Tr. p. 57, L.20 - p. 58, L.9. Moreover, the 
question of whether the power poles and landscaping prevented use of the Alley was res 
judicata, that question having already been litigated by the same parties in the prior action before 
Judge Horton. Def. Ex. A at 9-11 (findings of fact establishing that the presence of the 
landscaping and power poles did not impede use of the Alley). 
TSI's suit was brought without evidence or even a theory that would satisfy the very 
terms of the statutes TS! cited in support of the writ of mandate. TS! presented no evidence or 
even an allegation relevant to the central question of whether the encroachments at issue 
effectually obstructed and prevented use of the Alley, and that question was in any event 
foreclosed as res judicata as a consequence of the 2005 lawsuit concerning the same Alley. 
Accordingly, TSI's suit was brought and pursued frivolously, unreasonably, and without 
foundation. 
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3. ACHD is entitled to an award of costs and attorney fees on appeal. 
For the same reasons discussed in the prior section with respect to the proceedings below, 
ACHD is entitled to an award of attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 12-117 and 
12-121. In addition, TSI's appeal attempts to raise issues not brought before the district court, 
and seeks to have the Court revisit settled questions of fact without any allegation that those 
findings were based on anything less than substantial and competent evidence. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
ACHD respectfully requests that the Court affirm the dismissal of the petition for writ of 
mandate, but reverse the district court's denial of ACHD's request for expert witness costs and 
attorney fees incurred below. ACHD further requests an award of costs and attorney fees on 
appeal. 
DA TED this ~ay of July, 2009. 
TROUT+ JONES+ GLEDHILL+ FUHRMAN, P.A. 
By: 
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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature Of The Case 
This case involves an attempt by Plaintiff/ Appellant Total Success Investments, LLC to 
("TSI") to obtain a writ of mandamus to compel removal of certain alley encroachments. The 
District Court correctly concluded that the writ of mandamus should not issue because TSI failed 
to establish the statutory basis for its issuance. The District Court also correctly concluded that 
attorneys fees and costs should be awarded to Defendant/Respondent Washington Mutual Bank, 
N.A. ("WaMu"). 
B. Statement Of Facts 
1. Appellant's Statement of the Facts. 
Appellant TSI's statement of the facts is largely accurate, insofar as it goes. Appellant 
omits the prior procedural history which gave rise to the current litigation. 
2. Prior litigation 
In 2003 TSI and Respondent Ada County Highway District ("ACHD") became 
embroiled in a dispute regarding the same alley at issue in this litigation. At issue in that action 
was TSI's movement of a fence in the opposite side of the alley. See R. Vol. 1, P. 48. TSI had 
caused a fence surrounding a cellular tower to be moved to the actual property line, which had 
the effect of substantially and nearly completely blocking the alley. Judge Horton specifically 
found that prior to the movement of this fence, despite the existence of the landscaping and 
power pole encroachments, the alley had not been obstructed. R., Vol. 1, p. 52- 53. 
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When TSI moved the fence into the alleyway, ACHD demanded its removal. When TSI 
refused to do so, ACHD commenced an action to declare the existence of a prescriptive easement 
along a portion ofTSI's property. ACHD was successful in that action. 
Material to TSI's commencement of the instant action was dicta contained in the trial judge's 
decision. In the course of analyzing the effect of the various encroachments in the alley, Judge 
Horton noted that ACHD could have sought to remove the encroachments at issue in this action, 
but chose instead to seek a declaration affirming the existence of a prescriptive easement over 
TSI's property!. TSI's complaint in this action noted this dicta. See R., Vol. 1, P. 8 at paragraph 
15. Throughout the testimony and argument, TSI attempted to rely on this dicta as a basis for its 
motion for the show cause order. See, e.g. TR., Vol. 1, P. 17 LL 21-22; TR. Vol. 1, P. 25 L. 20-
P. 26, l. 17. Counsel for TSI repeatedly noted that this dicta "was significant in the decision to 
bring this action as an attempt to cure ... " the result of Judge Horton's decision. Tr. Vol. 1, P. 25, 
Ll. 18-19. 
C. Course Of Proceedings Below 
TSI filed its Application for Alternative Writ of Mandate against ACHD, WaMu and 
Idaho Power Company, seeking as its prayer for relief that the Court "Issue the Writ of Mandate 
requiring that ACHD, Washington Mutual Bank and Idaho Power Company to immediately 
remove or cause the removal of the encroachments in the alley." TR., Vol. 1, P. 9 and 10. TSI 
also sought issuance of an order to show cause "for ACHD, Washington Mutual Bank and Idaho 
1 TSI appealed the trial judge's decision, which was affirmed by this Court in Ada County 
Highway District v. Total Success Investments, LLC, 145 Idaho 360, 179 P.3d 323 (2008). 
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Power Company to explain why they have not removed or caused the removal of the 
encroachments in the dedicated alley." Id. TSI also prayed for an award of its costs and attorney 
fees in bringing its application. Id. 
ACHD promptly filed a memorandum opposing the issuance of a writ of mandate. 
W aMu joined in that motion, noting specifically that it had no duties "resulting from an office, 
trust or station" to which the writ of mandate may attach pursuant to Idaho Code§ 7-302. See 
Joinder In Motion filed by WaMu.2 
Based upon this application, the trial court issued an Order to Show Cause to all 
respondents, ordering their appearance at a hearing set for June 4, 2008, "to show cause why 
they have not removed or caused to be removed the encroachments from the dedicated alley." 
See Order to Show Cause. 
Following two separate evidentiary hearings, both ACHD and WaMu orally moved to 
dismiss the action. While WaMujoined in ACHD's motion, it separately moved to dismiss 
because it did not have any obligation to perform "an act which the law especially enjoins as a 
duty resulting from an office, trust or station ..... ," citing Idaho Code§ 7-302. See TR. Vol 1, P. 
117, Ll. 7-14. 
The Court issued its Memorandum Decision confirming that because the act sought to be 
compelled by the Alternative Writ of Mandate was discretionary, the writ could not properly 
issue. The Court ruled since the Application for the Alternative Writ of Mandate should be 
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dismissed, the Court need not "discuss any other issues raised by the parties." R. Vol. 1, P. 53. 
One of those issues was WaMu's motion to dismiss because it did not hold any office or position 
which could be compelled by a writ of mandate. TR., Vol. I, P. 111 L. 16- P. 113.; Tr. Vol. 1, 
P. 117, LI. 7-14. 
WaMu thereafter sought an award of its costs and fees incurred in defending against the 
Application for an Alternative Writ of Mandate. The basis for that argument was that since 
WaMu never had an official duty which could be compelled by a writ of mandate, TSI's action 
was brought against it mrreasonably and without foundation. See Memorandum of Costs and 
Fees filed by Washington Mutual. In response, TSI argued that "Washington Mutual was 
properly named in the action as it is the owner of the encroachments in the public right-of-way, it 
has a real interest in the writ and it is the party that would be compelled to remove the 
encroachments." See Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike filed by TSI on January 5, 
2009. 
The trial court issued a separate memorandum decision specifically finding that the claim 
against Washington Mutual was brought and pursued unreasonably and without foundation, and 
the Court awarded attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-121 and Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 54(e)(l). In making this ruling, the Court specifically noted that the decision to award 
attorney fees is discretionary. See R., Vol. I, P. 75-76. 
2 WaMu is filing a motion to supplement record to allow references to these pleadings. WaMu 




II. ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether WaMu is entitled to an award of attorneys' fees on appeal pursuant to 
Idaho Appellate Rules 11.1,41 and/or Idaho Code§ 12-121. 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The detennination of who is a prevailing party, for the purpose ofreceiving an award of 
attorney fees, is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. That determination will not 
be disturbed unless an abuse of discretion has occurred. Decker v. Homeguard Systems, 105 
Idaho 158,666 P.2d 1169 (Ct. App. 1983). 
In Parsons, Parsons v. Mut. Enumclaw Inc. Co., 143 Idaho 743 (2007), this Court 
explained that the calculation ofreasonable attorneys' fees is within the discretion of the trial 
court and that the "burden is on the party opposing the award to demonstrate that the district 
court abused its discretion." 143 Idaho at 747. To detennine whether the trial court abused its 
discretion, the reviewing court considers: (1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue 
as one of discretion; (2) whether the trial court acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion 
and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (3) 
whether the trial court reached its decision by an exercise ofreason. Id. 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. The District Court correctly concluded that TSl's action against WaMu was 
brought and pursued unreasonably and without foundation, justifying an award of 
attorney fees. 
1. A writ of mandate could never have issued against WaMu. 
WaMu did not hold any office or owe any duty "resulting from an office, trust or station" 
required by Idaho Code § 7-302 which would support the issuance of a writ of mandate. This 
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court has repeatedly ruled that mandamus will not lie unless the party seeking it has a clear legal 
right to have done that for which he seeks the writ, and unless it is a clear legal duty of an officer 
to act. See Freeman v. McQuade, 80 Idaho 387,331 P.2d 263 (1958); Fitzpatrick v. Welch, 96 
Idaho 280, 527 P.2d 313 (1974). 
TSI completely failed below to establish any basis upon which a writ of mandate could 
have issued against WaMu. To the contrary, TSI admitted that the action included WaMu "more 
to put them on notice that this action was pending regarding the property ...... " Tr. Vol. 1, P. 
117L.24-p. 118,1. 3. 
While providing notice may have been laudable, it could have been done by a telephone 
call, correspondence, or the filing of a !is pendens. Making WaMu a party to the action, and 
seeking issuance of a writ of mandate and an order awarding TSI its costs and fees goes far 
beyond merely providing "notice." 
2. TSl's sole argument for reversal of the attorney fee award is specious. 
TSI argues that because ACHD might be compelled to take action via a writ of mandate, 
WaMu is properly joined as a party. This non sequiter simply ignores the clear and 
unambiguous requirements for a writ of mandate, the sine qua non of which is the existence of a 
non-discretionary duty. WaMu could never have been subject to a writ of mandate because it 
had no official duties. It certainly may have been the subject of subsequent action by ACHD if 
that agency had required removal of the encroachments. TSI, however, sought relief against 
WaMu for a remedy it could never have obtained directly. This action was thus "frivolous" and 
"without foundation" as against W aMu. If this was not clear when the Application was 
originally filed, it was certainly obvious from the time ofWaMu's Joinder to the Opposition of 
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Writ of Mandate. Once a claim is clearly shown to be without merit, the continued pursuit ofit 
is frivolous and unreasonable. See Landvik ex rel. Landvik v. Herbert, 130 Idaho 54, 936 P.2d 
697 (Ct. App. 1997). 
3. WaMu is entitled to attorney fees on appeal. 
TSI has utterly failed to provide any assignment of error in the trial court's award of 
attorney fees in favor of W aMu. TSI has not shown where the trial court abused its discretion in 
any way. TSI does not, in fact, even present any argument, analysis or authority questioning the 
trial court's exercise of discretion below. 
In lieu of any analysis of the trial court's exercise of discretion, TSI merely argues that 
since the court may have found a basis to compel ACHD to take action, ACHD could have 
derivatively caused WaMu to take action. It is only in the tenuous connection derived from a' 
(rejected) claim that ACHD should act that TSI claims the writ of mandate against WaMu was 
thus justified. Aside from the fact that the record is devoid of any presentation of this argument 
below, the mere argument does not address any error in the trial court's exercise of its discretion. 
TSI merely invites this court to second guess the trial court's exercise of discretion. 
This Court has noted that where a party fails to provide argument or authorjty in support 
of the only issue on appeal properly before the Court, the appeal was brought and pursued 
frivolously, unreasonably and without foundation, justifying an award of fees on appeal. See 
Anson v. Les Bois Race Track, Inc., 130 Idaho 303,939 P.2d 1382 (1997). Idaho Appellate Rule 
11.1 and 41 are to the same effect. See also Pass v. Kenny, 118 Idaho 445, 797 P.2d 153 (Ct. 
App. 1990)(making no cogent challenge with regard to the trial judge's exercise of discretion 
justifies award of attorney fees under IAR 41). 
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Based on the continued pursuit, via this appeal, of a remedy against WaMu, and the 
complete failure to articulate any error in the record below, WaMu respectfully requests that it be 
awarded its costs and attorney fees on appeal. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This Court should affirm the District Court's dismissal of TSI' s Application for an 
Alternative Writ of Mandate. 
This Court should also affirm the District Court's award of attorneys' fees to WaMu 
below. The District Court correctly concluded that WaMu is entitled to an award of attorneys' 
fees pursuant to either Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(l) or Idaho Code§ 12-121. TSI also 
fails to establish that the District Court abused its discretion in the amount of attorneys' fees 
awarded. 
appeal. 
Finally, WaMu respectfully asks this Court to award its attorneys' fees and costs on 
DATED THIS t~y of July, 2009. 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP 
By¥---:--c=--==-'-'=~=-=-c:---:-:-'>.,,,------
Kenneth C. Howe , ISB No. 3235 
Attorneys for Defendant/Respondent 
Washington Mutual Bank 
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